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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF I J IAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO

:

Defendai it/ Appellai it

'

Case No. 20040965-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant/Defendant Paul Anthony Armijo ("Mr. Armijo" or "Appellant") appeals
from, a judgment of conviction for Illegal Possession/Use of Controlled Si lbstance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002), entered by
the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. This
Court has jurisdiction over criminal convictions other than first degree felonies. Utah
Code/Vnn § 7K-2a-3(c) (2(HJ !i

A o»|n nl thejudgmeni is in \ildeiuluni V,

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Issue. Whether the officers' violation of the "knock and announce" rule which
forms part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment constituted an
illegal searcl 1 w 1 lei i. the officers failed to \ v ait a i easonable amoi int. of tit i le before
entering the residence by force?
Standard of Review: The applicable standard is bifurcated. "The factual findings

of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress will not be
disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); Salt Lake Citv v.Rav. 2000 UT App 55, ^8, 998 P.2d 274. The trial court's
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness where this Court accords no deference to
the trial court's determination of the law in search and seizure cases. See State v. Brake.
2004 UT 95,115, 103P.3d699..
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 59-66; 84-92; 104-09; 126133; 201; 202; 203.
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statute and constitutional provisions are in
Addendum B:
U.S. Const, amend. IV;
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-210 (2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 15, 2003, Mr. Armijo was charged with disarming a peace officer, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (2003); unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002); four counts of assault on a peace officer, class A
misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4; and unlawful possession of
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5.
R. 3-6, 11-18. At the preliminary hearing on February 17, 2004, the trial court found
2

sufficient evidence to bind Mr. Armijo over on all the charges except the unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia which was dismissed. R. 35-36; 200:46.

Mr. Armijo

entered not guilt} pleas on tl IC i en laii in lg charges. R 35-36; 2130:46.
On March 26, 2004, Mr. Armijo filed a motion to suppress the illegally obtained
evidence. R. 59-66. On May 18, 2004, the State filed a memorandum in opposition to
the motion to suppress. R. 84-92, On June 11, 2004, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on Mr \ rn lijo's motioi l to si lppress. R 10 :1 05; 201 ' I he trial con lr I: set tl ic
hearing over until June 15, 2004 for the purpose of arguments. R. 201:22; 202. On June
15, 2004, the trial court took the matter under advisement. R. 202:13-15. On June 17,
2004, the trial court issued its ruling denying Mr. Armijo's motion to suppress. R. 10809; 2UJ

• • -.. v 12, 2004, the ti ial coi it I: entered its Findings of Fact, Coi ich isions of

Law and Order denying the motion to suppress. R. 121-125. A copy of the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence
is in Addendum C.
On Ji il) 19, 2004, I\ li: \ rmi jo ei iter ed into a coi iditioi ial guilt} plea pursuant to
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), wherein he pled guilty to one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, R 126-133. Mr.
Armijo and the State specifically agreed that Mr. Armijo entered into this plea "while
reserving his right to appeal tl i.e denial of 1 lis n lotiot i to suppress

"1 R 130 Oi i

November 1, 2004, Mr. Armijo was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5 years in

3

prison. R. 168. The trial court suspended the prison term and sentenced Mr. Armijo to a
term of 365 days in jail with no credit for time served. R. 169. Mr. Armijo filed a timely
notice of appeal. R. 172-73. On December 8, 2004, the trial court granted Mr. Armijo's
motion to stay sentence pending appeal. R. 197-98. Mr. Armijo was released from jail
on a $5,000 bond to the supervision of pretrial services. 198-99.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 2, 2003, Officer Jason B. Watkin, Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office, obtained a warrant to search a residence located at 2843 South 8700 West,
Magna, in Salt Lake County. R. 216-226. The sheriffs office was investigating possible
drug activity at the residence. R. 216-222. The search warrant authorized the search of
"all persons who are in the address sought... at the time of the Warrant" for "narcotics
and paraphernalia hidden on their person." R. 216, 224 In requesting the warrant, the
officer did not request the issuance of a "no-knock" warrant. R. 216-226 Accordingly,
the sheriffs office requested and obtained a "knock-and-announce" warrant which
required them to alert the occupants as to their identity and purpose and wait a reasonable
time before entering the residence. R. 224-26.
Thirty to forty-five minutes before sunrise, on December 4, 2003, Sergeant
Mathews,1 Detectives Brent Jex and Mike Ikemiyashiro and Officer Watkins, together

^ h e trial transcripts spelled Sergeant Mathews' name as "Matthews." However,
the trial court in its findings spelled it "Mathews." For consistency, Appellant spells the
sergeant's name in accordance with the trial court.
4

with eight other SWAT team members, served the warrant. R. 200:7; 201:6, 11, 15, 17.
Sergeant Mathews was in charge of the operation and in the lead team. R. 201:17-18.
Officer Watkins and Detective Ikei ni> ashiro were also part of the lead team going into
the residence first while Detective Jex brought

13, 17. The

SWAT team members were dressed in raid gear consisting of a black police tactical
uniform complete with weapons and "Police" printed in gold on the sleeves and on the
back and front of ? , ,:•: *
load-bearing vests witn punt

he team was also wearing helmets,
-= **.ls across *: •

: .«u»

IJJLVN,M,!

thigh holsters. R. 200:6-7; 201:7.
When the SWAT team was about one house to the north of the target residence, a
vehicle approached from the south. R. 200:8-9; 201:7. According to Detective Jex and
Officer Watkins, the vehicle appeared in linn Inwaid tht iltnvwn nf the residencr but
did not actually pull into the driveway. R. 201:8, 14, 17. Instead, it started to pull up to
it, then stopped, backed up and continued on down the street. R. 201:14, 17. As the
vehicle tinned towards the driveway, its headlights hit the SWAT team as they were
coming up the sidewalk. R. 201:8, 1*4, ,

]

"tV* < *• •>•; ^ ••• *-m wasth u «i..

Hide

changed directions after its headlights illuminated the team. k. ^u±. 14, 17. Detective
Jex said that even though it was dark outside, he noticed that the passenger in the vehicle
was on a phone R. 201:8. Detective Jex tried to get the license plate of the car and
communicated what he saw.

u:s, u . Sergeant Mall lews tl len. called oi itM Wt are

5

burned. We are burned. Execute." R. 201:8, 12, 17. At some point, Mathews told
Ikemiyashiro "that there was light and movement from the home." R. 200:19. Mathews
told Watkins later that night he had seen a light come on in the basement of the residence
after the vehicle had taken off. R. 201:19, 22.2 None of the other SWAT team members
testified that they saw a light come on in the house. R. 200:19, 20; 201:12, 18-19. Nor
did any officer testify that he saw any type of movement in the house or heard any
phones ringing or other sounds. R. 200:20; 201:15; 202:8-9.
When Sergeant Mathews called the "burn," the team was approximately 25 feet
away from the target house and move rapidly to execute the warrant. R. 201:9, 13, 17.
According to Officer Watkins, Sergeant Mathews "knocked on the door, very loudly,
[and] started yelling out, "Sheriffs office, search warrant, and then immediately the
breacher breached the door," and they entered the house. R. 201:18. The SWAT team
did not wait for the door to be answered before forcing it open. R. 201:20. Instead, they
used a battering ram and knocked the door open. R. 200:20. Detective Jex did not
know whether the lead team knocked or announced but said that "Police, search warrant"
was called out many times before he crossed the threshold of the residence. R. 201:9.
Similarly, Detective Ikemiyashiro who was part of the lead team did not recall whether
there was a knock but said there could have been. R. 200:20. Detective Ikemiyashiro

2

Sergeant Mathews was unavailable to testify so defense counsel stipulated that
his testimony concerning the light in the basement could come in through the testimony
of the other officers. R. 201:22.
6

thought M[t]here may have just been a breach and then an entry." R. 200:20. However,
as soon as the door was open they started to announce "Police serving a search warrant.1'
R. 200:21.
After Detective Ikemiyashiro entered, he made his way toward the back of the
home. R. 200:9. Once at the back of the home, he found a set of stairs leading down to a
basement. R. 200:9. Detective Ikemiyashiro called out downstairs and then waited for
support from Detective Jex. R. 200:9. When additional officers were able to assist,
Ikemiyashiro made his way down the stairs. R. 200:9; 201:10. Ikemiyashiro and Jex
scanned the main area and not seeing any threats went into the first open door. R.
200:10; 201:10. The officers saw Mr. Amijo, the only person in the basement, lying on a
mattress asleep. R. 200:10-11; 201:10. The officers yelled out "Police serving a search
warrant" but Mr. Armijo did not awaken. R. 200:11; 201:11. Detective Ikemiyashiro
attempted to wake Mr. Armijo but Mr. Armijo was not responding to his verbal
commands. R. 200:11. Detective Ikemiyashiro nudged him with his foot but Mr. Armijo
was still unresponsive. R. 200:11, 21. Once Mr. Armijo opened his eyes and appeared
as though he was awake, Detective Ikemiyashiro continued to shout "Police, serving a
search warrant." R. 200:12. When Mr. Armijo awoke he lunged towards the officers.
R. 200:12. Detective Ikemiyashiro indicated in his report that after Mr. Armijo stood up
he, "used [his] boot and kicked Mr. Armijo back down to the mattress." R. 200:22. Mr.
Armijo resisted the officers attempts to restrain him but was eventually restrained and

7

taken to jail. R. 200:12-15. After he was taken to jail, jail officers searched Mr. Armijo
and found a bag of methamphetamine in his pocket. R. 200:15-17.
Mr. Armijo filed a motion to suppress the evidence which the trial court denied.
R. 123; 203:5. The trial court stated that its decision to deny the motion to suppress was
made by looking at the circumstances "subjectively through the eyes of the officers at the
scene to assess the specific facts of this case." R. 123; 203:3. The Court noted however
that it was greatly troubled by "the fact that the light supposedly came on in the
basement, [but] the person down in the basement,.. ., was sound asleep." R. 203:5.
However, the trial court stated that it had to look at the circumstances subjectively,
therefore, based on its subjective analysis the trial court determined that the officers
"would have thought that there were exigent circumstances and that they needed to go
into the home." R. 123; 203:5. This appeal followed. R. 172-73.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement and Utah Code Ann. §
77-23-210 (2003), officers possessing a search warrant must knock and announce their
authority before forcibly entering a residence. Only if exigent circumstances exist may
officers dispense with this requirement. When determining whether exigent
circumstances exist, courts are required to review the totality of the circumstances from
an objective perspective. In this case, the trial court erroneously denied Mr. Armijo's
motion to suppress the evidence when officers violated the knock and announce

8

requirement, determining that it had to look at the totality of the circumstances
subjectively through the eyes of the officers in deciding whether there were exigent
circumstances. An objective review of the totality of the circumstances in this case does
not support exigent circumstances, therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's
denial of Mr. Armijo's motion to suppress.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE AN OBJECTIVE VIEW OF THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT SUPPORT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
In serving search warrants, the federal constitution requires police officers to
announce their authority and purpose and then to wait a reasonable time for a response
before forcibly entering a residence. U.S. Const, amend. IV.; Utah Code Ann. § 77-23210 (2003). The police may only dispense with these requirements if exigent
circumstances require immediate entry. When determining whether exigent
circumstances existed, courts review the totality of the circumstances from an objective
perspective. In this case, the trial court made its determination by viewing the
circumstances "subjectively through the eyes of the officers at the scene to assess the
specific facts of this case." R. 123; 203:5. Although the trial court was troubled by the
inconsistent testimony as to whether a light came on in the basement, it nevertheless
erred by looking at the circumstances subjectively, and making its determination from a
subjective standpoint that "it was reasonable for the officers to believe that exigent

9

circumstances arose, necessitating their rapid entry into the home

" R. 123;203:4-5.

The trial court's determination that exigent circumstances existed based wholly on
the officers' subjective views rather than an objective determination based on the totality
of the circumstances was erroneous. When viewed objectively, the officers' illegal entry
into the residence requires suppression because it violated Mr. Armijo's fundamental
right to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. Because
exigent circumstances did not exist justifying the officers violation of the "knock and
announce" rule, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Armijo's motion
to suppress.
A. The United States Supreme Court Has Held That the Knock and Announce
Rule Falls Within the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Requirement.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend IV. "The purpose of the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of reasonableness is to preserve that degree of respect for the
privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision
was adopted — even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to
considering all sorts of intrusion reasonable." Richards v. Wisconsin. 520 U.S. 385, 392
n.4 (1997) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (internal
quotations omitted).
The Fourth Amendment encompasses the common law principle generally
10

requiring the police to "announce [] their presence and authority prior to entering" a
building when serving search warrants. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).
These requirements, known as the "knock and announce" rule, mandate that police wait
"a reasonable period of time" before entering. State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 413 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (declining to recognize that all violations of the "knock and announce" rule
are fundamental) abrogated by Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); see also Miller
v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) ("The requirement of prior notice of authority
and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should
not be given grudging application.").
In Wilson, the Supreme Court noted that while its prior case law has
"acknowledged that the common-law principle of announcement is 'embedded in AngloAmerican law/ [it has] never squarely held that this principle is an element of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [but] now so hold." I4_ at 934
(citations omitted). Holding that the "common law 'knock and announce9 principle
forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment," IcL at 929, the
Supreme Court stated that "[g]iven the longstanding common-law endorsement of the
practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry into a dwelling was among the
factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure. IcL at
934.

11

Utah has codified these common law "knock and announce" and "no-knock"
principles in Utah Code Annotated section 77-23-210 (2003). Utah's search warrant
statute states:
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building,
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing
the warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he
is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing
the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed or, or secreted, or that physical
harm may result to any person if notice were give.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210; see. United States v. Ramirez. 523 U.S. 65, 73 (1998)
(determining that because the federal "knock and announce" statute codifies the common
law "and the common law in turn informs the Fourth Amendment, [the Court's]
decisions in Wilson and Richards serve as guideposts in construing the statute").

In

codifying the common law "knock and announce" rule, Utah's statute seeks to ensure
"(1) the protection of an individual's private activities within his home, (2) the
prevention of violence and physical injury to both police and occupants which may result
from an unannounced police entry, and (3) the prevention of property damage resulting
from forced entry." State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988); see also 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure §4.8 (a) (4th Ed. 2004). "[T]he individual interests
implicated by an unannounced, forcible entry should not be unduly minimized."

12

Richards. 520 U.S. at 393.
With the holdings of Wilson and Richards, the United States Supreme Court has
clarified that a violation of the flknock-and-announce,f rule is a fundamental violation of
a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. See. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934; Richards, 520
U.S. at 393. The Supreme Court's ruling on the question abrogates this Court's holding
in State v. Ribe. 876 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), which declined to adopt a per se
rule that all violations of the "knock and announce" rule constituted a "fundamental"
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, since Wilson, this Court has recognized that
"[t]he 'knock and announce' rule . . . safeguards Fourth Amendment rights, [by]
protecting citizens from violations through the misconduct of police officers." State v.
Zesigner, 2003 UT App 37, ^|12, 65 P.3d 314 (citations omitted).
Because the "knock and announce rule" falls within the fundamental right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, violation of the rule requires suppression.
See State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992) (determining suppression appropriate
remedy for violations of fundamental rights); State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah
1988) (same). Therefore, when officers in this case violated the "knock and announce"
rule by forcing entry into the residence without waiting a reasonable time, they violated
Mr. Armijo's fundamental right to be free from unreasonable seraches under the Fourth
Amendment. This fundamental violation required the trial court to grant Mr. Armijo's
motion to suppress the evidence.

13

B. An Exigent Circumstances Analysis Requires the Trial Court To Make An
Objective Determination Based on the Totality Of the Circumstances.
Although the knock and announce rule falls within the Constitution's
reasonableness requirement for searches, that principle "was never stated as an inflexible
rule requiring announcement under all circumstances." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934. The
obligation to announce and wait "gives way when officers 'have a reasonable suspicion
that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would
be dangerous or futile, or would . . . inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for
example, the destruction of evidence.'" United States v. Banks. 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003)
j

(quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 394 (holding blanket exception to the knock-andannounce requirement for felony drug investigations unconstitutional)); see also State v.
White. 851 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("trial court reviews the no-knock
authorization for reasonableness."); State v. Rosenbaum, 845 P.2d 962, 966 n.2 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) ("criteria for issuance of no-knock searches . . . is less stringent than that
required for the initial probable cause determination.").
However, a reasonable suspicion requires the police officer "to point to 'specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.5" Sery, 758 P.2d at 940 (quoting Tern v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). "Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches . . . ."
Sery, 758 P.2d at 941 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). In Utah, magistrates may issue
14

a no-knock warrant if the police can show beforehand that similar circumstances exist.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (2) (no-knocks issued nupon proof, [and] under oath, that
the object of the search may be quickly destroyed . . . or that physical harm may result...
if notice were given.11). The task of determining whether a given police entry is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is left to the lower courts. Wilson, 514 U.S. at
936.
When determining whether a police entry was reasonable because exigent
circumstances existed, the trial courts are required to look objectively at the totality of
circumstances surrounding the entry. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 36; State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). While an "officer's subjective belief may nevertheless be
factored into the objective analysis,... it is never alone determinative." State v. Warren,
2003 UT 36, ^[1, 78 P.3d 590. Exigent circumstances are defined "as those that would
cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical
harm to the officers or other person, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of
the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law
enforcement efforts." City of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Richards, 520 U.S. at 391 ("[T]he
knock-and-announce requirement could give way 'under circumstances presenting a
threat of physical violence,' or 'where police officers have reason to believe that
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.'" (citation omitted)).
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However, "exigency does not evolve from one individual fact. Instead, there is often a
mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258.
It has been emphasized by Utah's appellate courts that an exigent circumstances analysis
always "requires an objective determination; that is, while exigent circumstances have
multiple characteristics, the guiding principle is reasonableness, and each case must be
examined in the light of the facts known to the officers at the time they acted." Henrie.
868 P.2d at 1391 (citations and quotations omitted).
In this case, the trial court erred in determining that even though it was troubled
by Sergeant Mathews' claim that a light came on in the basement in relation to the
vehicle that pulled away from the residence, it had to look subjectively at the
circumstances to determine whether exigent circumstances existed. Trial counsel argued
that the court should find that a light in fact did not come on in the basement because the
claim lacked evidentiary support given that only the sergeant claimed to see a light out of
the twelve SWAT team members present at the scene. R. 202:9, 12. The trial court then
made the following ruling:
You know, the court has struggled with this for a while. And a lot of it has
to do with the testimony I've heard and the case law that's been presented.
But based on what's in front of me, and based on the court's review of the
evidence that was presented, I'm going to deny the defense's motion. It
was a tough decision. But I think the Court has to make a decision, a
subjective decision, or look at it subjectively as the peace officers looked at
i t . . . in this particular situation.
What you've asked me to do, [defense counsel], I can't do, and that's
basically comes down to ignoring what the testimony would have been of
16

Sergeant... Mathews. In regards to the light coming on. I think that the
officers had a good reason to believe that they were burned under these
circumstances. The evidence showing that as they were getting ready to
approach the house, and were basically at the driveway of the house that
they were going to search, that they had the knock and announce search
warrant for, the testimony I've heard was that the car pulled into the
driveway, or started to pull into that driveway, that the lights illuminated,
all of the officers. I have at least three officers that have testified here, that
they saw what appeared to be the individual in the vehicle on a cell phone.
They then received, over their ear pieces, the notice from Sergeant
Mathews that a light had gone on in the house and that the, they were
burned, meaning that they were discovered.
I think again, I have to look at that as subjectively as the officers would
look at it. I think at that point they would have felt that there were exigent
circumstances that one, the, or that the people in the house had been
notified; two, that the evidence could have destroyed; and three, that their
safety was at risk.
I think it's a really close call....
I don't think that this court is in the position to say that the police did not think
that their lives were in danger or that there were exigent circumstances under the
facts that I heard . . . .
What troubled me the most was the fact that the light supposedly came on in the
basement, the person in the basement, they say, was sound asleep. In fact,
they had trouble waking him up. It does trouble me. It troubles me greatly.
But again, I think I'd have to look at it subjectively as they would have
seen it under that situation. And I think this court, at least, can make a
determination that they would have thought that there were exigent
circumstances and that they needed to go into the home.
R. 203:3-5 (emphasis added).
The trial court found in its written findings of fact, that n[s]everal detectives
testified that their on scene supervisor, Sergeant Mathews said that as the vehicle drove
off he observed a light come on in the basement
17

" R. 122 (emphasis added). The

trial court never affirmatively found that a light actually came on in the basement, simply
that this sergeant "said" that he saw a light come on in the basement. The trial court then
went on to erroneously apply the wrong standard to the totality of the circumstances
concluding "[t]o determine if exigent circumstances existed in this case, the Court looked
subjectively through the eyes of the officers at the scene to assess the specific facts of
this case." R. 123. Appellant, does not dispute that Sergeant Mathews "said" he saw a
light come on in the basement but instead disputes that when viewed objectively the
weight of the evidence supports that a light actually came on.
The evidence regarding the light in the basement consisted of the following:
Detective Ikemiyashiro was told by Sergeant Mathews, who was in charge of the
operation, "that there was light and movement from the home." R. 200:19. Detective
Ikemiyashiro does not clarify at what point Sergeant Mathews told him "that there was
light and movement from the home." R. 200:19. Detective Ikemiyashiro did not actually
see a light on in the basement himself. R. 200:19. It is not clear whether Sergeant
Mathews communicated his concern about a light allegedly being on in the basement to
any of the officers prior to calling the "burn." R. 200:8, 19-20. However, according to
the testimonies of Detective Jex and Officer Watkins the only communication heard prior
to forcefully entering the residence was Sergeant Mathews stating "We are burned, We
are burned. Execute." R. 201:12, 17. In fact, Detective Jex had never heard anything
"about any lights or anything like that." R. 201:12.
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Similarly, Officer Watkins was not aware of Sergeant Mathews seeing a light
come on in the basement until sometime after entry into the residence. R. 201:19.
Detective Jex and Officer Watkins both testified that they did not see a light on in the
basement in relation to the vehicle in front of the residence. R. 201:12, 17-19. While
Detective Jex believed he may not have seen a light because his attention was focused on
getting the vehicle's license plate number, and Officer Watkins may not have seen the
light because his attention was focused on the front of the house, it does not explain why
none of the other officers also did not see a light. R. 201:12, 17-19. Furthermore, no
evidence was presented that any of the twelve officers heard any noise such as a phone
ringing or movement of any type coming from the house. R. 200:20; 201:15.
Based on the evidence presented by the State, the trial court realized the
probability of the sergeant actually seeing a light come on in the basement was belied by
the officers' testimony that when they searched the basement the only person down there
was Mr. Armijo who was asleep and extremely difficult to wake up. R. 203:5 The trial
court was troubled by the sergeant's claim regarding the light even stating that "the light
supposedly came on in the basement." R. 203:5. However, the trial court denied Mr.
Armijo's motion to suppress because it believed that it had to look at the circumstances
subjectively to make a determination regarding exigency. R. 203. Given the trial court's
concerns regarding the sergeant's testimony, had the court applied the correct objective
standard analysis it would have determined that a light had not come on in the basement.
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The remaining circumstances, when looked at objectively, did not rise to the level of
exigency necessitating the officers forced entry into the home.
The objective factors in this case consisted of the following: The SWAT team
members were about a house away from the residence when an unknown vehicle
approached from the south. R. 200:8-9; 201:7. The vehicle turned towards the driveway
of the target residence but did not pull into the driveway. R. 201:8, 14, 17. Instead, the
vehicle pull up to the curb, stopped, backed up and continued on down the street. R.
201:14, 17. As the vehicle was turning towards the driveway, its headlights hit the
SWAT team as they were coming up the sidewalk. R. 201:8, 14, 17. The officers'
subjective impression was that the vehicle changed directions after its headlights
illuminated the team. R. 201:14, 17. Detective Jex noticed that the passenger in the
vehicle was on a phone. R. 201:8. Detective Ikemiyashiro also thought "it looked like
someone might have been on the phone in that vehicle." R. 200:9. However, Detective
Jex testified that the passenger was already on the phone when he first observed him. R.
201:15. Detective Jex then communicated to the other officers that the passenger was on
the phone. R. 201:8. Detective Jex did not know to whom the passenger was on the
phone and did not hear any phones ringing from inside the house when he approached.
R. 201:15. Detective Ikemiyashiro who was one of the first ones to approach the
residence also testified that he did not hear anything coming from inside the house. R.
200:20.

20

The totality of these circumstances, considered objectively, do not support exigent
circumstances necessitating a forced entry either for the protection of the officers or to
prevent the destruction of evidence. See. Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388; Richards, 520 U.S.
at 391. Although the officers may have believed the vehicle continued on its way after
seeing them, that is not enough to create exigent circumstances as to what is occurring
inside the target residence. Even though Detective Jex noticed that the vehicle's
passenger was on the phone, he did not know to whom this individual was talking. In
fact, Detective Jex testified that the passenger was on the phone when he first saw him,
not that he made the call after seeing the officers. R. 201:15. Other than Sergeant
Mathews' lone claim that a light came on in relation to the vehicle's presence, none of
the other officers testified that they were concerned that this passenger was alerting the
residents of their presence. The officers testified that they simply believed that the
vehicle changed direction after seeing the officers. R. 201:14, 17. Therefore, under an
objective analysis, the totality of these factors weighs against a finding of exigent
circumstances.
Even if Sergeant Mathews' lone claim regarding the light is considered among the
factors, it was still not enough to create exigent circumstances. When obtaining the
search warrant, Officer Watkins sought and received a "knock and announce" warrant.
R. 216-226. Though the officer believed that controlled substances and firearms would
be found at the residence, he did not seek a "no-knock" warrant. R. 216-226; Ribe „ 876
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P.2d at 413 n.27 ("If the police had fears concerning safety of the destruction of evidence
before undertaking the search, they would presumably have sought a no-knock
warrant."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (2) (no-knocks issued "upon proof, [and] under
oath, that the object of the search may be quickly destroyed . . . or that physical harm may
result.. . if notice were given.").
Instead, the officer sought a "knock and announce" warrant to "be issued for the
seizure of said items at any time day or night" to prevent the possibility of the items
"being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason . . . " R. 222.
The "other good reason" articulated by the officer for the issuance of a search warrant
which allowed a nighttime search consisted of the following:
The cover of darkness would enhance an undetected approach to the
residence without endangering the safety of police officers or innocent
uninvolved parties. It also aids in defeating counter surveillance
techniques used by illegal narcotic distributors. The cover of darkness
would enhance the ability to approach and enter the residence while
reducing the possibility to retrieve a weapon or arm any explosive device or
trap to defeat law enforcement. Furthermore the address sought to be
searched on this Warrant/Affidavit is located in a residential neighborhood.
Service of the search warrant during the hours of darkness will insure the
safety of neighbors, occupant of the address sought to be searched, and
other involved parties due to their presence in the area being limited during
those hours.
R. 222.
Hence, even though the officer's belief was that if the residents were made aware
of the officers approach it would enable the residents to "conceal[]" or "destroy []"
evidence or allow for "the possibility to retrieve a weapon," the officer still sought a
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"knock and announce" warrant. R. 222. Yet the very purpose of a "knock and
announce" warrant is to give the residents notice of the police officers presence and
authority and allow them an opportunity to comply. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210
(1) (statute requires officers to give notice of their authority and purpose and wait for a
reasonable amount of time for admittance). "As [the Supreme Court] observed in
Wilson, the common law recognized that individuals should have an opportunity to
themselves comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a
forcible entry. These interests are not inconsequential." Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5;
Banks, 540 U.S. at 41 ("One point in making an officer knock and announce,..., is to
give a person inside the chance to save his door."). Otherwise, "when police enter a
residence without announcing their presence, the residents are not given any opportunity
to prepare themselves for such an entry." Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5. As the Supreme
Court recognized, the argument "that... most search warrants are executed during the
late night and early morning hours" does not excuse officers from complying the
requirements of a "knock and announce" warrant. IdL. "The brief interlude between
announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to
pull on clothes or get out of bed." Id.
Furthermore, officers cannot create their own exigency because of their subjective
belief that their preferred method of approaching the residence may have been negated by
a passing vehicle. As stated above, the purpose of a "knock and announce" warrant is to
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give the residents notice and time to comply. See supra. A light on in the basement does
not impart any more information about what is occurring in the residence than the
officers' knew before obtaining the warrant. The officers' belief or knowledge about the
destructibility of evidence and possibility of weapons remained the same. Although
officers sought to conceal their approach with the "cover of darkness1' to "enhance an
undetected approach," a light coming on in the basement did not suddenly eliminate the
mandated requirement for the officers to give notice of their authority and purpose and
wait a reasonable time for a response.
Upon approach of the residence, the officers did not hear any noises suggesting
the destruction of evidence. No other officer testified that they saw a light come on as
they approached the home or even heard of its possibility until after the execution of the
warrant. In fact, the record does not support that any of the officers were especially
concerned with either their safety or the destruction of evidence stemming from the
alleged light on in the basement. Despite the presence of at least twelve SWAT officers,
no testimony was offered indicating any urgency that some of the officers move quickly
to secure the basement given the possibility that the light indicated that evidence was
being destroyed or that the residents were arming themselves. Rather, the testimony of
Detective Ikemiyashiro indicates that the officers did not have any immediate concerns
with the happenings that might be occurring in the basement above those in the rest of
the residence. Instead, Detective Ikemiyashiro testified that "[o]nce [he] got to the back
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of the home, [he] found a set of stairs . . . that led down to a basement." R. 200:9. He
"called out downstairs" and then "waited for support." R. 200:9. "Then once additional
officers were able to assist" him he made his way downstairs to the basement. R. 200:910.
In sum, an objective analysis of the totality of the circumstance in this case shows
that a light did not come on in the basement and the remaining factor of a vehicle
changing directions upon seeing at least twelve SWAT officers coming down the street
does not support exigent circumstances. However, even if the light is considered among
the factors it did not create exigent circumstances. The very purpose of a "knock and
announce" warrant is to provide notice to the residence of the officers presence and
authority and give them an opportunity to comply. Furthermore, the evidence presented
by the state does not indicate that the officers had any exigency concerns about what
might possibly be happening in the basement. Therefore, at most, a light on in the
basement would signify to the officers that they might have to wait a little longer once
they knock and announce their presence for someone to answer the door.
Because the officers violated the "knock and announce" rule by forcing their way
into the residence without waiting a reasonable amount of time in absence of exigent
circumstances, suppression of the evidence is required.
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CONCLUSION
The Appellant, Mr. Armijo, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial
court's denial of his motion to suppress, and reverse his conviction.

SUBMITTED this AJ*day of April, 2005.

/

-^Y , A
DEBRA M. NELSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RALPH DELLAPIANA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATF ^ VTAH
STA"rE 'rr- TTTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
-- No: 031908515 FS

PA.L.~ ANTHONY ARMIJO,
Defendant.

ige:
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Novemb^ •'

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
^ r .'UDfiMEtyTS

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: KNET.:
• r-.'
J
Defendant
Def endant ' s A1.1o rney (s} DELLAPIANA, RALPH
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 8, 3 971
Video
'I'.i
Tape Number:
CD#7

. :JCTT5

I" 03

CHARGES
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Gi lilty
Disposition: 07 '] 9/2004 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
•"""'"TROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
icenced to an indeterminate term, of not to exceed five years in
w«3 Utah State Prison.
The prison term, is suspended.
••

Criminal Sentence {

JD16494549
ARMUO.PAI II '\N1 1 il I Ml!

Case No: 031908515
Date:
Nov 01, 2004

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for
this charge is 0 day(s).
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
NO CREDIT TIME SERVED.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$5000.00
$3975.00
$4 84 .46
$1025.00
$5000.00
$3975.00
$484.46
$1025.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
Fines and fees to be supervised by AP&P.
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
The amount of Adult Probation & Parole

Case No: 031908515
Date :
Nov 01, 2004
ORDER CF PROBATION
The defendant Is placed on prooation ror 36 :i., .*<£ Probation is to be supervised by A d u 1 ^ Proba:
S Parole.
De f endant to s erve 3 65 day(s) iai
Def endant Is to pay a £11 ie of ^,_,. ^ „.:iic 1 i i nc 1 i ide s t 1 Ie ; si i :c 1 l a i "ge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and. ordinary conditions required by the r^par^er.t - • "-z
Probation & Parole,
Submit to searches of person and property upon
c^ie:Law Enforcement Officer.
". use, consume or possess alcohol o> -.legal drugs, ru:;
sociate with any people using, possess:ru] cr -onsuming ~ . cor*: 1 ^r
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upt...
request z<- -,:
,A >
Enforcement Officer.
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, oi
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Submit to drug testing,
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.

Case No: 031908515
Date:
Nov 01, 2004
Court will consider an early release if defendant completes CATS.
Dated this _j

day of

' \ i * ' * "'

DENNIS M. FUCHS

ADDENDUM II

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
H le rig|1^ 0 | j j ^ p e 0 p| e LUfoes e c u n ||j y l e l r persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

77-23-210. Force used in executing warrant — When notice of authority is required as a prerequisite*
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building,
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or
he is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or
that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
Case No. 031908515 FS
L ANTHON\ ARMIJO,
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs
Dciendant.

THF A BOVF ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFCJPI
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nj

determinuiiiMi. • mc Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidau t. on Junel L * 5. aiv

by Byron F. Burmester, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. Based upon the
folinioity H*f k;lQ ip'cs BtTii* lr* itiJl l,i«,un \\ .itkins, and the Preliminary Hearing
testimony of Detective Mike Ikemiyashiro, and Sergeant Mathews, memoranda, and the
ar^unu'iits pieM-nk'

mnsel, and for good cause shown, the Court, now makes and

enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. OnDecemhrr 4 ,'Min Sail l.akv ( ninth pnluv ol'iK'cis saved a seiiicli
warrant at the Defendant's place of residence, 2843 South 8700 West.

>

2. The search warrant provided for a knock and announce search during day or
nighttime hours.
3. The officers were dressed in helmets, vests, and clearly marked uniforms.
4. As the officers approached the residence, just before sunrise, an unknown
vehicle began to turn into Defendant's driveway, and in doing so, its
headlights illuminated the officers approaching the home.
5. After illuminating the officers, the car quickly drove back out onto the street
and continued past the officers.
6. At that time, Detective Jex observed a passenger in the car talking on a cell
phone as the vehicle reversed and left the premises.
7. Several detectives testified that their on scene supervisor, Sergeant Mathews,
said that as the vehicle drove off he observed a light come on in the basement
of Defendant's home.
8. Sergeant Mathews communicated to the team, based on all of the
observations, that he thought they had been "burned" and their search was
compromised.
9. The officers were one residence away when the car noticed them, and they
took approximately another 10 seconds to reach the porch of the house.
10. Based on this assessment, the officers continued to approach Defendant's
residence, but abandoned the knock and announce protocol, and knocked
whiling forcing entry into the home and announcing their presence and
purpose.

I N C L U S I O N S OF LAW
1. Police officers r •

s

-•

k and annoi tiic: e pi oce cii u: es if exigent

circumstances warrant a reasonable concern, that: (1) evidence will be
desti oyed. 01 (2) the officers' ' safety (oi the safety of another) is at risk,
.;

To determine nV\ »oeni cimimstances existed in this case, the Court looked
subjectively thiuu b ,, the eyes of the officers at the scene to assess the specific
facts of this case.
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Based on the vehicle illuminating the officers as they approached the home;

phone, and the officer's tesiimom ihai Serjeant Mathews's saw a light come
>n ill lllit" basemen! altcj the velnek Icll the drivc\va>, the Court concludes it
was reasonable for the officers to believe that exigent circumstances arose,
necessitating their rapid entry into the home- for fear of destruction of evidence
and the saielv . •*

r

n, ••;.

Based upon the evidence offered by the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the
;ii]»[ H id nig ntetiNHiimd.t lln: t mill d e m o tin.' Nelcndan' s Motion to Suppress E \ idence.
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_ £ . „ day ofjjuw; 2004
BY THE C

^fitid*^*

Hon. EfenWsm Fuchs
District 6ajirt Judge

Read and Approved as to Form
Ralph Dellapima
Attorney for Defendant
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BYRON F. BUR
\ -init} District Attorney
• ast Broadw ay. Suite 40^
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P«y Clerk
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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 031908515 FS
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PAUL ANTHONY ARMMO,
Doienuam.

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions ol Law, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADTl TDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied.

2.

A hearing is set for July 12, 2004, at 8:30 a.m.

DATED this /£

day of-Jane, 2004.

BY THE COURT:

Hon. iJejihtsMfFuchs"" 1
District, Court Judge

